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Abstract. The aim of this research note is two-fold, firstly, to clarify the growing
interaction between regional science and Austrian economics and their awareness
of each other. We elucidate the Austrian methodology, called praxeology, which
is especially misunderstood in regional science. Secondly, we tentatively sketch a
possible contribution of Austrian economics to regional science. The core of the
new economic geography is the idea of external economies of scale. Agglomera-
tion of firms often leads to lower costs of existing products, and is a stimulating
environment for the invention of new products and the development of new ideas.
Austrian economics, which places discovery at the centre of its analysis of the mar-
ket process, should be able to explain why (public) regional investments may be
unsuccessful and why they can be successful.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays it seems as if regional science is discovering Austrian economics (Hite
1995; Rees 1999) and, one may add, Austrian economics is discovering regional
science (Desrochers 1998, 2001). The aim of this research note is to clarify the
growing interaction between these two disciplines and their awareness of each
other. Sections 2 and 3 focus on methodological misconceptions and on substantive
points of misunderstanding. Section 4 considers in what way Austrian economics
can contribute to regional science.
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2 Methodology of the Austrian school
Two recent articles (Hite 1995; Rees 1999) on the fruitfulness ofAustrian economics
for regional science show confusion between the substance (the content of Austrian
economics) and the method by which the Austrians reach their conclusions. This
confusion might originate from the negative opinion of neoclassical economists for
Austrian economics, thus inspiring little interest in its achievements. Mark Blaug,
a leading historian on the history of economic thought, once said of the method
used by the founder of the modern Austrian school of economics: “His (Ludwig
von Mises) later writings on the foundation of economic science are so cranky
and idiosyncratic that we can only wonder that they have been taken seriously by
anyone” (1980, p. 93). To this day, this is still the opinion of a large majority of
neoclassical economists.
So what is the Austrian method? It is a method first explicitly written down
by Mises (1949, 1966) and to a lesser extent, by Friedrich Hayek, the 1974 No-
bel prize winner for Economics. Their method is called praxeology (the logic of
action), a name that characterises the verbal axiomatic-deductive method of Aus-
trian economics. It is based on a form of introspection shared by everyone, and is
characteristic of that used for logical and mathematical truths. Praxeology consists
of the verbal elaboration of the logical implications of the fundamental and some
subsidiary axioms of human action. Praxeology begins with the fundamental, self-
evident axiom that “men act by virtue of their being human”. Human beings try to
exchange a poor situation for a better one. Things that do not act purposefully are
not classified as human beings. A human being that does not act, in other words,
who does not behave rationally, changes into a plant; he vegetates. “Human action
is necessarily always rational. The term ‘rational action’ is therefore pleonastic . . .
The opposite of action is not irrational behavior, but a reactive response to stimuli
on the part of the bodily organs and instinct” (Mises 1966, pp. 19–20).
Hence the only test of an economic theory is the truth of the evident premises
and the logical analyses built on it. We deduce, save logical errors in the deduc-
tive process, true conclusions from a true axiom. So for the Austrians – in so far
as the premises are true – economic theory is absolutely true; testing is meaning-
less. The Austrian methodology stands against the logical positivist one inspired
by the natural sciences. The latter method is copied as a role model by modern
mainstream neoclassical economics. The Austrians are accused of being unsci-
entific (see Blaug’s remark just cited). For the neoclassical, economic laws can
only be established tentatively, by testing empirically (verifying or falsifying) the
consequences. The praxeologist makes no use of mathematical economics or econo-
metrics. Mathematical formulations are always quantitatively precise, but they are
unable to portray qualitative differences. Every step in the market process depends
on human decisions that are mental, qualitative and immeasurable. In physics, the
preference for its use is based on certain constants. But what if there are only vari-
ables (historical data) and no constants? To speak of variables when there are no
invariables does not make sense (Rothbard 1951, 1962).
Praxeology has a few broadly empirical axioms, such as that individuals vary
in tastes and abilities, that human beings find leisure a valuable good, and that
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people learn from experience. The axiom that people learn from experience is
fundamentally important to the description of the market as a systematic sequence of
economic states. Its broadly empirical character is based on the general inclination
of human beings to be alert to opportunities. Although we recognise that people
err, we assume that man tends to notice potential opportunities for gainful action.
“The market process emerges as the necessary implication of the circumstances
that people act, and that in their action they err, discover their errors, and tend to
revise their actions in a direction likely to be less erroneous than before” (Kirzner
1979, p. 30). It is this description of human behaviour and the market process that
regional science perceives as the “Austrian” method, which is apparently incorrect.
Although regional scientists speak of the Austrian methodology it is in fact the
substance they refer to. Regional science, however, should be aware that, for the
Austrians, mainstream neoclassical and Austrian methodology are not – as Hite
(1995, p. 177) assumes – complementary forms of doing economics.
3 Substance of Austrian economics
For modern Austrians the main difference between the neoclassical market model
and Austrians’ own is that, in theirs, adjustment processes and market disequilibria
are central. Adjustment copes with dispersed knowledge and the lack of it. The
central point of their approach is the incurable ignorance of most of the particular
circumstances that determine the course of society. In contrast to the neoclassics, for
the modernAustrians, correct foresight (full knowledge) is not a precondition for the
attainment of equilibrium, but the defining characteristic of the state of equilibrium.
“The statement that, if people know everything, they are in equilibrium, is true,
simply because that is how we define equilibrium” (Hayek 1949, p. 46).
Unlike most cases in the neoclassical model, in the modern Austrian market
model, action does not primarily follow from an optimal choice in a given ends-
means relation. At the centre of the modern Austrian market model is the process
of conceiving the ends-means relationship. True choice requires the realistic pos-
sibility of more than one alternative. Choices are not only concerned with merely
selecting the highest out of an array of given and ranked alternatives, but also em-
brace the perception and evaluation of the alternatives identified as relevant (Kirzner
1989, p. 18).
For the Austrian economist, process, discovery and uncertainty are essential for
everyday economics. “It is not that markets work despite the open-ended uncertainty
surrounding human action, but rather that they work precisely because of this quality
of human action. The open-ended uncertainty of the environment itself provides
the scope and possibility for an entrepreneurial process of competitive discovery”
(Kirzner 1989, p. 234). The central point of theAustrian approach is man’s incurable
ignorance. “Thus entrepreneurial activity ... undoubtedly involves uncertainty and
the bearing of risk” (Kirzner 1973, p. 78; 1985, pp. 40–67).
Austrians emphasise freedom of contract (making use of decentralised knowl-
edge) as essential for the functioning of markets. Not because it produces perfect
efficiency, but because it produces more efficient outcomes than governmental in-
tervention does. According to them, there is no efficient non-market resource allo-
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cation. This was the insight the Austrians tried to bring to the fore in the socialist
calculation debate that raged in the 1930s; a debate beginning with the question,
“Is an efficient non-market resource allocation possible?” No, says the Austrian.
Market-based prices are necessary to signal scarcity, to transmit knowledge and to
stimulate discovery. And as Mises concludes: “Inasmuch as money prices of the
means of production can be determined only in a social order in which they are
privately owned, the proof of the impracticability of socialism necessarily follows.
[T]his proof is certainly the most important discovery made by economic theory”
(1981, p. 157).
The calculation debate brought to the fore two modern Austrian insights. First,
without market-determined monetary prices, rational calculation is impossible in
a centralised economy. Subjectivism entails the contention that values cannot be
calculated or measured directly. They are calculated with the results of individual
valuations: money prices. “For a long time,” says Friedrich Hayek, “the misconcep-
tion that costs determined prices prevented economists from recognising that it was
prices that operated as the indispensable signals telling producers what costs it was
worth expending on the production of the various commodities and services, and
not the other way around” (1978, p. 2). Second, without market-determined mon-
etary prices, a centralised economy lacks ability to promote discovery. “The most
impressive aspect of the market system is the tendency for [...] opportunities to be
discovered” (Kirzner 1985, p. 30). Prices expressed in money show price discrep-
ancies. Through the possibility of monetary profits, prices stimulate the discovery
of valuable concrete information. And it is precisely the institutional setting of the
market economy that translates error into prospective net gain. As the Austrians
say: The whole organisation of the market mainly serves the need to spread the
information on which buyers act. So indeed, the instantaneous global interaction
by the Internet can increasingly facilitate market transactions and thereby improve
the coordination of plans. However, the sort of knowledge of relevance to Austrian
economics is of a completely different order. It is a specific practical kind of knowl-
edge embedded in and dispersed among the minds of millions of people. It is the
specific knowledge, of which we do not even know that we have it, or need it, until
the moment is there.
The above implies a fundamental difference between the work of Joseph Schum-
peter and mainstream modern Austrian economics. Although Schumpeter is widely
cited (Rees 1979, 1999; Nijkamp 1987) in the literature on the fruitfulness of Aus-
trian economics for regional science; nowhere in his writings does he use the mod-
ern Austrian methodology. And though indeed it is true they both emphasise the
entrepreneurial role in the market process, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is, by any
standard, no equilibrating force in the market process. In fact, it is quite the op-
posite; he is a disequilibrating force. Long-run developments in new commodities,
technologies, sources of supply and type of organisations are at the core of his
idea of market processes. Just about the opposite of the Austrian way of describ-
ing the equilibrating competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery: short-run
as well as long-run developmental changes caused by the innovator as well as the
imitators who exploit the opportunities exposed by the activities of the innovators.
For the Austrian, as opposed to Schumpeter, price competition is as essential to
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entrepreneurship as that represented by the new commodity and new technology
(Kirzner 1973, pp. 125–131; 1999, pp. 5–17).
4 Austrian regional economics
Austrian economics has a few characteristic features important to regional eco-
nomics. Firstly, it considers the economy so dynamic that mechanistic modelling
does not help us understand it. Secondly, Austrian economics is the science of the
process of choice of human actors that is difficult to predict. Actors may react dif-
ferently to the same stimuli under more or less the same circumstances. Thirdly,
economics is considered to be the science of exchange between individual actors,
in which government plays no significant role. To put it bluntly, the government is
considered to be an agent blocking the process of choice, and should therefore be
limited as much as possible. Fourthly, individuals act under uncertainty. Consumers
and producers do not have full knowledge of their environment, not in the present
and certainly not in the future. This means that there is an element of discovery in
the behaviour of economic actors. This includes their attitudes and actions toward
risk.
Economic growth is a spatial phenomenon. As Desrochers (1998) puts it: “1.
Where prosperity exists, it is regionally based; 2. The sources of this prosperity
are to be found in the regions themselves and not in some exogenous factors”.
This means that growth is not evenly spread over a country, but is concentrated in
centres, which can be called growth poles, clusters, cores, or agglomerations. The
reason for this is external economies of scale. Because of these, costs can be reduced
and knowledge flows easily between producers, stimulating technological renewals
(Desrochers 2001). This element has been present both in regional economics and
Austrian economics for a long time, but has been neglected in mainstream general
economics. This is the reason why regional and general economics have mainly
developed along different lines (Krugman 1995, 1997).
It has been argued that telecommunication technology will diminish the ad-
vantages of geographical proximity of especially small, specialist firms. This is
probably untrue. High knowledge-intensive activities, like the development of new
products need not only face to face contacts, but also “face to product” contacts. By
the latter we mean that it is very difficult to replace the physical contact between
buyer and product by means of telecommunication of abstract descriptions. It is
also difficult to provide after sale service in that way. Only standardised operations
and products may become footloose, because of new ways of telecommunication
(Desrochers 1998).
The uneven regional distribution of economic development is the basis for re-
gional policy. Mainstream regional economics is mechanistic by nature. For Krug-
man (1995, 1997), even regional economics is a science of modelling. In essence,
this means that economic subjects, just like rats, react to economic stimuli always
in the same way (Hite 1995). This has an element of truth in it in the short-run. In
the long-run, however, technological renewal and creative destruction change the
way of life, and with that, the behaviour of choice of consumers and producers. The
mechanistic nature of regional economics and regional policy based on it is also the
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reason for failures in the attempts of stimulating backward regions by public invest-
ments. In this respect the Austrian approach resembles the behaviouristic “prospect
theory” in its criticism on the rigid assumptions of neoclassical economics, in which
a concept like “loss aversion” is considered a non-rational aberration of human be-
haviour (Tversky and Kahneman 2000).1
The mechanistic view of clusters or growth poles is that it is quite simple to
stimulate economic growth in a region that lags behind.;onstructing a growth pole
will cause regional economic growth to come automatically.
In several European countries in the past (1960s and 1970s), even a growth
pole policy existed, which intended to stimulate backward regions by the public
initiation of growth poles or clusters. Generally speaking, it was not successful.
Austrian economic theory aims at explaining why regional investments may be
unsuccessful and how they can be successful.
Austrian economic theory would argue that the market is the key factor in
regional development, and that although it is possible for the government to stim-
ulate existing promising regional economic activities, it is not possible to generate
a growth pole out of nothing. Because so many specific regional circumstances
must be taken into account, central government simply lacks the information to
be successful in this. Further, clustering of economic activities and, as a con-
sequence, unevenly distributed regional development, are inevitable elements of
national economic growth. This theory would conclude that evenly distributed re-
gional economic growth is a contradiction, and that therefore regional economic
policies aiming at that are doomed to fail. The spatial clustering of economic ac-
tivities is a market phenomenon to be fostered by the public administration, but it
cannot be initiated by it.
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